Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Ostrom analyzes several cases where parties have failed to organize to protect a CPR or where institutions designed to do so were threatened. Specifically, she studies two Turkish inshore fisheries, a California groundwater basin with problems, a Sri Lankan fishery, irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka, and Nova Scotian inshore fisheries. She then analyzes common factors accounting for these failures.

Fisheries in Bodrum and the Bay of Izmir, both in Turkey, suffered from rent dissipation and overfishing. Unlike Alanya, Turkey, where the CPR has been protected, the number of fishers was large and heterogeneous. For example, in Bodrum, there was conflict among small-scale fishermen and large-scale operators. There was also an increase in demand for fresh fish near Izmir, incentivizing fishers to bring in more. The national government was not helpful, as it neither limited the number of licenses granted nor enforced rules “forbidding trawlers to fish within a three-mile offshore zone and within bays” (146). Ostrom concludes that there was not one reason for the failure of appropriators to organize and protect the CPR. All these factors contributed, as well as the lack of political arenas in which to obtain low-cost, enforceable agreements.