Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

In the successful cases, a mix of “private and public instrumentalities” were used to solve CPR issues (182). This fact upends the prevailing academic assumption that the only way to solve CPR problems is via either privatization or central authority. Since the dominant academic theories make assumptions about the lack of communication among appropriators and their inability to change rules, these theories are not applicable to smaller CPRs. Further study of smaller-scale CPRs is thus needed.

The current theories of collective action are problematic for small CPRs for three reasons. First, they do not reflect the incremental nature of institutional change. Second, they ignore the impact of external political regimes. Third, they do not account for information and transaction costs. The use of nested enterprises is critical to success. In other words, small organizations are formed first, and then larger ones follow. 

Individuals are likely to make commitments to abide by rules under certain conditions: if there are clear definitions of who can use the resource, the rules relate to the specifics of the local resource, the rules are designed at least in part by the appropriators themselves, the rules are monitored by the appropriators or those answerable to them, and there are graduated sanctions for violations.